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Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature of expectation formation mechanisms by 
bringing new evidence on how non-financial corporations shape their expectations on 
the availability of external finance. We link consecutive surveys from the Survey on 
the Access to Finance of Enterprises to investigate which expectation formation 
mechanism governs Eurozone firms regarding their expectations on the availability of 
external finance. In line with the past literature, we demonstrate that the Rational 
Expectations hypothesis is rejected by the data and we find evidence in favor of the 
Adaptive Expectation mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
 Firms’ expectations are an essential factor determining the phases of the business 
cycle, therefore making them important for economic activity (Gennaioli and Schleifer, 
2018). Especially, studying firms’ expectations on the availability of external (bank) 
finance is crucial given the significant impact they have on firms’ future investment 
and hiring decisions (Ferrando et al., 2019). Given the importance of firms’ 
expectations, a natural research question that arises is, how do firms shape their 
expectations on the availability of external finance? The answer to this question is vital 
in directing policymakers in designing proper monetary policies, as both the 
employment and inflation targets of central banks around the world are highly 
dependent on the firm-level decision process.  
In this study, we employ new survey data from the Survey on the Access to Finance 
of Enterprises (SAFE) to explore under which mechanism non-financial corporations 
shape their expectations on the availability of external (bank) finance. In particular, we 
examine the three main expectations’ generating mechanisms: Rational Expectations, 
Adaptive Expectations, and Regressive Expectations. 
The notion of Rational Expectations was a paradigm shift in economics. Muth 
(1961) was the first who introduced the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH), 
according to which Rational Expectations are defined as “the true mathematical 
expectation of the variable of interest conditional on information on all other related 
variables known”. After Muth (1961), Lucas (1972), Frenkel (1975) and Sargent and 
Wallace (1976) have further developed the notion of REH. These studies in Rational 
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Expectations have produced a revolution in economics1. A significant amount of 
literature has also been spawned regarding the efficiency and the formation of the 
expectations’ hypothesis (Goodwin and Sheffrin, 1982; Moosa and Shamsuddin, 2004; 
Jongen and Verschoor, 2007).  
On the other hand, there is also a significant amount of literature supporting that 
the REH does not provide the best description of the real world due to its limitations. 
According to Chow (1989, 2011) and Drakos (2008), the first limitation of the REH is 
that it does not premise any special expectation formation mechanism. Second, 
according to the REH, the rationality of economic agents, along with the market 
discipline, will eliminate all the insistent errors, which in turn will lead economic agents 
to make effective use of all the current information, regardless of how expectations are 
produced. An additional and significant drawback that exists when we test the REH 
empirically is that expectation errors are usually shaped through ex-post observed data. 
Chow (1989, 2011) argued that Adaptive Expectations are better than Rational 
Expectations by providing strong econometric evidence. The author also stated that 
REH was empirically insufficiently supported by the researchers who first embraced it 
in the late 1970s. 
Expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way by many researchers so far. 
However, there is a rapidly increasing literature on the mechanisms that form 
expectations, by employing survey data2 (Fraser and MacDonald, 1993; Dominitz and 
Manski, 1997; Dutt and Ghosh 1997; Pesaran and Weale, 2006; Drakos, 2008; Dave 
                                                          
1
 Pesaran (1987), Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) and Dominitz and Manski (1997) have mentioned that 
the notion of the REH has impressively revised the way that the economic policy is conducted as well as 
economic modeling is done. 
2
 A significant number of studies have also shown that macroeconomic models have a better performance 
when survey-based expectations are employed rather than model-constructed expectations (see for 
example Batchelor, 1986; Madsen, 1996 and Lee and Shields, 2000).  
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2011; Miah et. al., 2016; Anastasiou and Drakos, 2019; Anastasiou, 2020). The main 
merit of employing survey data is that they correspond to the expectations of the 
respondents. As Manski (2004) stated, one of the best ways to assess both the accuracy 
and correctness of expectations is to follow the respondents as the time passes and then 
contrast their expectations with the real events they experienced.  
Following the fundamental tenets of the literature just outlined, our analysis aims 
to exploit survey responses from successive surveys to explore how firms’ expectations 
of future availability for bank finance perform when confronted with realized outcomes. 
This is the first study studying firms’ expectations on the availability of external finance 
implementing survey data of firms’ expectations from the SAFE database on a country 
level. Principally, in any given SAFE issue, senior executives of both Small-Medium 
size Enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises are inquired to respond to the previous 
period’s availability for bank finance (actual), as well as the future (expected) one. 
Hence, by linking successive survey responses, we investigate whether senior 
executives’ expectations are formed rationally. If there is evidence that rationality does 
not exist, we examine whether the expectations comply with well-known expectations’ 
formation mechanisms. 
This study contributes to the literature of expectations in two distinct ways. First, 
we provide new evidence regarding the expectation formation mechanisms that govern 
non-financial corporations in the Eurozone regarding the availability of external (bank) 
finance. Second, we find that non-financial corporations do not form their expectations 
for the availability of bank finance rationally. Instead, they seem to update their 
expectations based on the latest information in their information set, implying that the 
Adaptive Expectations mechanism best describes our data. These results remain robust 
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when we break our sample to Small-Medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and Large 
enterprises and they also apply to both core and peripheral Eurozone countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used. 
Section 3 presents the empirical methodology we follow, while Section 4 includes the 
estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data Description 
To quantify the availability of bank finance (AF) we utilize data from the SAFE, 
which is conducted on a semi-annual basis by the European Central Bank (ECB 
hereafter). SAFE contains very useful information about the financing conditions faced 
by non-financial corporations in the Euro-area. ECB dispatches a questionnaire to top-
level executives of a representative sample of Euro-area enterprises (more than 10,000 
firms) asking them to provide information for their past and expected conditions 
concerning their financial situation and their financing conditions. These top-level 
executives are usually either a CFO or a CEO for large firms and the owner for the 
smaller ones.  
Below we provide the relevant questions from SAFE: 
Question Q9: Would you say that the availability of bank finance has improved, 
remained unchanged or deteriorated for your enterprise over the past six months?  
 
Answer: 
• Improved 
• Remained unchanged 
• Deteriorated 
• Not applicable to my enterprise 
Source: Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises Questionnaire, Section 4: Availability of 
finance and market conditions, question Q9. 
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Question Q23: Looking ahead, please indicate whether you think the availability 
of bank finance will improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged over the next six months  
 
Answer: 
• Will improve 
• Will remain unchanged 
• Will deteriorate 
• Not applicable to my enterprise 
Source: Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises Questionnaire, Section 4: Availability of 
finance and market conditions, question Q23. 
 
 
We exclude corporations that answered that bank finance is “Not applicable to my 
enterprise” since materially they have not responded to the relevant questions. 
Our sample covers the period 2009H1-2018H2 for 14 Euro-area countries, where 
AF is broken down to Small and Medium Enterprises (SME hereafter) and Large 
enterprises. This produces a panel dataset of 294 observations, consisting of half-yearly 
country-firm size dimensions. 
The data for AF are expressed as a diffusion index3 and not as the raw responses of 
senior executives. The diffusion index signifies an increase (decrease) of AF when it is 
increased (decreased). In Table 1 we report the sample averages of both actual and 
expected AF by country.  
*****Insert Table 1 here***** 
                                                          
3
 For a detailed definition of Diffusion Index see the Glossary of the Bank Lending Survey of ECB. 
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3. Empirical Methodology and Testable Hypotheses 
We start our analysis by testing the REH4, according to which agents are trying to 
use the past period’s information set in an optimal way to forecast the future. The 
definition of the REH is not such an easy task. An attempt to define REH could be that 
REH is the expectation formation process/mechanism according to which agents use 
all the relevant and available optimal (i.e., rational and efficient) information, which 
sooner or later will expunge systematic forecasting errors. In other words, under REH, 
agents do not make any systematic errors in forecasting, considering the whole set of 
available information. 
The scatterplot of Figure 1 provides a pictorial representation of the expected vs 
actual diffusion index. As we observe, it is not clear whether firms’ expectations for AF 
are formed rationally.  
*****Insert Figure 1 here***** 
Following Drakos (2008), Anastasiou and Drakos (2019) and Anastasiou (2020), 
we examine the REH by employing the following model: 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐴 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
 where i, t, A, and E, denote country-firm size, time, actual AF, and expected AF, 
respectively. AF at the right-hand side of the equation is expressed in one period lag 
signifying that the expectation has been formed prior to the actual outcome. The 
associated joint hypotheses test for the above model is: 
Ho: 𝛾0 = 0, 𝛾1 = 1 
                                                          
4
 REH has not always been met with empirical success. An important disadvantage of testing the REH 
empirically is the fact that the expectation errors are usually formed through ex-post observed data. A 
way to bypass this disadvantage is to measure expectations by relying on survey data (Pesaran and Weale, 
2006; Drakos, 2008 and Miah et. al., 2016). 
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If these hypotheses are not rejected, this would suggest that the REH is consistent 
with the data, and therefore we could conclude that firms form their expectations for 
the availability of finance in a rational manner. 
In simple terms, we can define the Adaptive Expectations model as an expectation 
formation mechanism according to which the future value of the variable under scrutiny 
depends solely on its historical values. That is to say, economic agents (that is, firms’ 
top-level executives or owners) make forecasts for the future AF based on actual 
historical values adjusted for their past expectations. Conforming to the Adaptive 
Expectation formation mechanism, economic agents adjust their forecasts in each 
period contingent upon the previous period's expectation/forecasting error. According 
to Lovell (1986), if the forecasting error was zero (that is, we had a perfect forecast in 
the previous period), then this would entail that the last expectation would be preserved 
continuously. 
Following Lovell (1986), Moosa and Shamsuddin (2004), Drakos (2008), 
Anastasiou and Drakos (2019) and Anastasiou (2020) the Adaptive Expectations model 
can be written as:  𝛥𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸 = 𝜃(𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2𝐸 − 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
where θ is the coefficient of adaptation showing the pace of adjustment to the 
previous period’s expectation error. In other words, the adaptation rate shows the rate 
by which economic agents adapt their expectations. According to Lovell (1986), Moosa 
and Shamsuddin (2004), and Drakos (2008) and Anastasiou and Drakos (2019) to 
accept the Adaptive Expectations hypothesis, the coefficient of adaptations has to be 
negative and lie in the open interval (-1,0).  
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We also test whether the parameter θ (a) is different from zero and (b) is different 
from its maximum theoretical value (i.e. -1 for Adaptive Expectations): 
(a) H0: θ = 0 
(b) H0: θ = -1 
The Regressive Expectations model suggests that economic agents adapt their 
expectations in relation to the deviation of the last period from the average value of the 
variable under scrutiny (AF in our case). That is, owners and top executive managers 
believe that the AF displays an inclination to move towards its mean (Drakos, 2008 and 
Anastasiou and Drakos, 2019). In line with Pesaran and Weale (2006), Drakos (2008), 
Dave (2011), Anastasiou and Drakos (2019) and Anastasiou (2020), we express the 
Regressive Expectations mechanism as follows: 𝛥𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐸 = 𝛽(𝜇 − 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐴 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
where, Δ, 𝜇 and β signify first differences, the sample mean of actual AF and the 
adjustment parameter, respectively.  
So as to accept the Regressive Expectations Hypothesis, parameter β must be 
positive and lie in the open interval (0, 1). Additionally, we tested if the parameter β 
(i.e. the speed of adjustment) is (a) statistically significant, and (b) different from its 
maximum theoretical value (i.e. +1 for Regressive Expectations):  
(a) H0: β = 0 
(b) H0: β = 1 
In order to estimate all the models as mentioned above, we employ both fixed and 
random effects methodologies with cluster robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Performing the Hausman specification test (1978), we find that the fixed effects 
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estimator is the appropriate methodology in the Adaptive Expectations model, and the 
random effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for both the Regressive and 
the Rational Expectations models.  
4. Results 
In Table 2 we report all the estimation results for every expectation formation 
mechanism with the corresponding hypotheses tests for both random effects and fixed 
effects estimation methods. We start with the estimation results of the REH. Although 
we find that the coefficient γ1 is significant at the 1% level, turning to the joint 
hypothesis test of the REH we find that the probability value is equal to 0.000. This 
finding signifies that the null hypothesis is emphatically rejected at any conventional 
level of significance. This finding provides evidence against rationality, and therefore 
we infer that the REH is not consistent with the data. 
Next, we turn our attention to the estimation results of the Adaptive Expectations 
mechanism. We document that the speed of adjustment θ is statistically significant at 
the 1% level (i.e., non-trivial) and different from its maximum theoretical value of -1. 
If we take the point estimate of the coefficient of adaptions θ in absolute terms, this 
gives us the so-called adaptation rate, which is equal to 56.8% and 42.8% for the fixed 
and random effects methodologies, respectively. Accordingly, we need, on average, 1.8 
and 2.3 time periods to cover the distance between the forecasted and actual AF for 
both fixed and random effects approaches, correspondingly.  
The estimated coefficient of adaptions θ carries a negative sign, signifying that if 
firm top-level executives/owners had overestimated (underestimated) the actual AF in 
the current period, they would then adjust downwards (upwards) their expectations for 
the next period (Anastasiou and Drakos, 2019; Anastasiou, 2020). Furthermore, the 
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parameter θ lies in the open (0, 1) interval for both estimation methodologies, and hence 
we infer that the Adaptive Expectations mechanism is consistent with our data. Our 
results are consistent with the findings of Chow (1989), Chow (2011) and Anastasiou 
and Drakos (2019), who also supported that the Adaptive Expectations are the dominant 
expectation formation mechanism. 
Finally, we move on to the results of the regressive expectation hypothesis. We 
document that the point estimates of the adjustment parameter β are negative in both 
estimation methods. Hence, we conclude that the Regressive Expectations mechanism 
is not consistent with our data. 
*****Insert Table 2 here***** 
In order to ensure that our findings are not sensitive (that is, they retain their 
significance), we perform a sensitivity analysis based on two variants of the previous 
analysis. First, we split our sample to SMEs and large enterprises, and then we re-
estimate our models. Second, we break our sample into ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ euro 
area countries. Following Anastasiou et. al., (2019), we define as ‘peripheral’ countries 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, while as ‘core’ the rest countries of our 
sample.  
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results from the first sensitivity analysis, 
while Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results from the second sensitivity analysis, 
respectively. We find that even when we break our sample into multiple sub-groups, 
our baseline results remain robust. Therefore, we infer that the Adaptive Expectations 
hypothesis is the dominant expectation formation mechanism for firms’ expectations 
on the availability of finance.  
*****Insert Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 here***** 
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5. Conclusions 
Employing European survey data from the SAFE database, we explored the 
performance of the main competing expectation formation models regarding firms’ 
expectations for the availability of external finance. Our sample spans the period 
2009H1-2018H2, and we examine 14 Euro-area countries. Our findings suggest that 
the hypothesis that expectations fulfill the (orthogonality) conditions of the Rational 
Expectations hypothesis is rejected by the data. Instead, the adaptive expectation 
formation mechanism is the best description of the data. These findings remain robust 
when we break our sample into multiple sub-groups. 
Although our results do contribute to the growing literature of expectation 
formation mechanisms, this study could be further enhanced in the future. Specifically, 
further research could be conducted using a micro-level analysis. Such an investigation 
would foster the elucidation of the dynamic nature of firms’ expectations formation at 
the firm level. 
  
13 
 
References  
Anastasiou, D., and Drakos, K., (2019). “A note on bank loan officers' expectations 
for credit standards: Evidence from the European bank lending survey”, International 
Journal of Finance and Economics, 24 (1), 49-53.  
Anastasiou, D., Louri, H., and Tsionas, M., (2019). “Non-Performing Loan in the 
Euro-area: Are Core-Periphery Banking Markets Fragmented?”, International Journal 
of Finance and Economics, 24(1), 97-112. 
Anastasiou, D. (2020). “Senior bank loan officers' expectations for loan demand: 
Evidence from the Euro-area”, MPRA Working Paper, No. 98903. 
Batchelor, R., (1986). “Quantitative vs. qualitative measures of inflation 
expectations”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 48, 99-120. 
Chow, G., (1989). “Rational versus Adaptive Expectations in Present Value 
Models”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(3), 376-384. 
Chow, G., (2011). “Usefulness of Adaptive and Rational Expectations in 
Economics”, CEPS Working Paper No. 221. 
Dave, C., (2011). “Are Investment Expectations Rational, adaptive or regressive?”, 
Economic Inquiry, 49(1), 212-225. 
Dominitz, J. and Manski, C., (1997). “Using Expectations Data to Study Subjective 
Income Expectations”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92, 855-867. 
Drakos, K., (2008). “Efficiency and formation of expectations: evidence from the 
European investment survey”, Applied Economics, 40(8), 1015-1022. 
Dutt, S., and Ghosh, D., (1997). “Are experts’ expectations rational? A 
multicurrency analysis”, Applied Economics, 29, 803-812. 
Ferrado, A., Gannoulis, I., and Preuss, C., (2019). “Firms’ expectations on the 
availability of credit since the financial crisis”, ECB Working Series, No. 2341. 
Fraser, P., and MacDonald, R., (1993). “The efficiency of CAC expectations: a 
survey based perspective”, Revue Economique, 44, 991-1000. 
Frenkel, J., (1975). “Inflation and the Formation of Expectations”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 1, 403-421. 
Gennaioli, N. and Shleifer, A. (2018). “A Crisis of Beliefs”, Princeton University 
Press. 
Goodwin, T., and Sheffrin, S., (1982). “Testing the Rational Expectations 
hypothesis in an agricultural market”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 64, 558-67. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). “Specification tests in econometrics”, Econometrica, 46, 
1251-1271. 
Jongen, R., and Verschoor, W. F. C., (2007). “Further Evidence on the Rationality 
of Interest Rate Expectations”, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions, 
and Money, 18, 438-448. 
14 
 
Lee, K., and Shields, K., (2000). “Expectations formation and business cycle 
fluctuations: an analysis of actual and expected output in UK manufacturing industries, 
1975–1993”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62, 463-490. 
Lovell, M., (1986). “Tests of Rational Expectations Hypothesis,” American 
Economic Review, 76(1), 110-124. 
Lucas, R., (1972). “Expectations and the neutrality of money”, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 4, 103-24. 
Madsen, J., (1996). “Formation of inflation expectations: from the simple to the 
Rational Expectations hypothesis”, Applied Economics, 28, 1331-1337. 
Manski, C. F., (2004). “Measuring Expectations”, Econometrica, 72, 1329-1376. 
Miah, F., Saifur, R., and Khalid, A., (2016). “Rationality of survey based inflation 
expectations: A study of 18 emerging economies’ inflation forecasts”, Research in 
International Business and Finance, 36, 158-166. 
Moosa, I., and Shamsuddin, A., (2004). “Expectation formation mechanisms, 
profitability of foreign exchange trading and exchange rate volatility”, Applied 
Economics, 36, 1599-1606. 
Muth, J., (1961). “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements”, 
Econometrica, 29(3), 315-335. 
Pesaran, H. M., and Weale, M., (2006). “Survey Expectations”, in Handbook of 
Economic Forecasting, edited by G. Elliott, C. W. J. Granger, and A. Timmermann, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Pesaran, H., (1987). “The Limits to Rational Expectations”, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford and New York. 
Sargent, T., and Wallace, N., (1976). “Rational Expectations and the theory of 
economic policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 169-183. 
Wooldridge, J., (2010). “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data”, 
2nd (second) edition, The MIT Press.  
  
15 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Mean values of AF by Country 
Diffusion Indices 
Countries 𝐀𝐅𝐢,𝐭 𝐀  𝐀𝐅𝐢,𝐭−𝟏𝐄  
Austria -4.314 -6.763 
Belgium 0.797 4.739 
Cyprus -1.122 5.700 
Estonia 1.228 -2.152 
Germany 11.807 4.725 
Greece -33.453 -22.486 
Ireland -5.512 7.194 
Italy 6.816 11.617 
Latvia -6.168 5.770 
Lithuania -0.465 0.157 
Luxembourg 16.651 18.305 
Portugal 12.835 11.087 
Slovenia -4.314 -6.763 
Spain 0.797 4.739 
Total (average for the Euro-area) 1.538 3.485 
Notes: (a) This table reports the mean diffusion indices of both actual and expected availability of bank 
finance (AF) from enterprises by country along with the corresponding mean diffusion indices for the whole 
sample (average for the Euro-area), (b) AFi,t A and AFi,t−1 E denote actual and expected AF respectively. 
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Table 2: Estimation results for each Expectation Formation mechanism 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜸𝟏 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) - - - - 
θ - - -0.568*** (0.062) 
-0.428*** 
(0.052) - - 
β - - - - -0.031 (0.026) 
-0.025* 
(0.015) 
Constant -1.520*** (0.207) 
-1.539 
(1.772) 
1.386*** 
(0.113) 
1.128 
(0.755) 
0.285*** 
(0.046) 
0.296* 
(0.155) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 294 
R2 0.632 0.632 0.345 0.345 0.002 0.002 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247 0.088 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.293 0.000 0.799 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜸𝟎 = 𝟎 and 𝜸𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: β = 0 - - - - 0.247 0.088 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: β = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) β1, δ and λ are the estimated parameters for Rational, 
Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest the fixed effects estimator as the 
appropriate methodology in the Adaptive Expectations model, while the corresponding p-value in the Regressive and the Rational Expectations model suggest the 
random effects estimator as the appropriate methodology. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for each Expectation Formation mechanism: Small and Medium-sized Firms 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜸𝟏 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) - - - - 
θ - - -0.648*** (0.052) 
-0.489*** 
(0.058) - - 
β - - - - -0.0370 (0.022) 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 
Constant -4.047*** (0.060) 
-3.928** 
(1.697) 
2.985*** 
(0.214) 
2.327*** 
(0.896) 
0.419*** 
(0.067) 
0.398*** 
(0.150) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 218 
R2 0.634 0.634 0.401 0.401 0.003 0.003 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.035 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.634 0.000 0.784 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜸𝟎 = 𝟎 and 𝜸𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: β = 0 - - - - 0.127 0.035 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: β = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) β1, δ and λ are the estimated parameters for Rational, 
Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest the fixed effects estimator as the 
appropriate methodology in the Adaptive Expectations model, while the corresponding p-value in the Regressive and the Rational Expectations model suggest the 
random effects estimator as the appropriate methodology. 
18 
 
 
  
Table 4: Estimation results for each Expectation Formation mechanism: Large Firms 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜸𝟏 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) - - - - 
θ - - -0.474** (0.110) 
-0.439*** 
(0.109) - - 
β - - - - -0.021 (0.059) 
-0.024 
(0.055) 
Constant 5.448** (1.399) 
5.731* 
(3.117) 
-1.817** 
(0.522) 
-1.647 
(1.417) 
0.098 
(0.930) 
0.058 
(1.158) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 76 
R2 0.517 0.517 0.279 0.279 0.001 0.001 
F-test (p-value) 0.006 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.742 0.661 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.381 0.172 0.908 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜸𝟎 = 𝟎 and 𝜸𝟏 = 𝟏 0.030 0.000 - - - - 
H0: β = 0 - - - - 0.242 0.661 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.023 0.000 - - 
H0: β = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.017 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) β1, δ and λ are the estimated parameters for Rational, 
Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest the random effects estimator as 
the appropriate methodology in all Expectations models. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for each Expectation Formation mechanism: Periphery EU Countries 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜸𝟏 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) - - - - 
θ - - -0.523*** (0.092) 
-0.443*** 
(0.081) - - 
β - - - - -0.006 (0.026) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
Constant -4.047*** (0.275) 
-4.139* 
(2.333) 
2.759*** 
(0.375) 
2.431** 
(1.087) 
0.612*** 
(0.007) 
0.610*** 
(0.200) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 133 
R2 0.690 0.690 0.296 0.296 0.000 0.000 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.824 0.457 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.213 0.006 0.823 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜸𝟎 = 𝟎 and 𝜸𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: β = 0 - - - - 0.824 0.457 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.001 0.000 - - 
H0: β = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) β1, δ and λ are the estimated parameters for Rational, 
Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest the fixed effects estimator as the 
appropriate methodology in the Adaptive Expectations model, while the corresponding p-value in the Regressive and the Rational Expectations model suggest the 
random effects estimator as the appropriate methodology. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for each Expectation Formation mechanism: Core EU Countries 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜸𝟏 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) - - - - 
θ - - -0.628*** (0.074) 
-0.442*** 
(0.088) - - 
β - - - - -0.112** (0.045) 
-0.071** 
(0.036) 
Constant 0.977*** (0.243) 
1.117 
(2.424) 
0.0943*** 
(0.003) 
0.101 
(1.097) 
-0.225 
(0.136) 
-0.102 
(0.307) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 161 
R2 0.318 0.318 0.413 0.413 0.017 0.017 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.047 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.709 0.000 0.322 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜸𝟎 = 𝟎 and 𝜸𝟏 = 𝟏 0.004 0.000 - - - - 
H0: β = 0 - - - - 0.036 0.047 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: β = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.001 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) β1, δ and λ are the estimated parameters for Rational, 
Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest the fixed effects estimator as the 
appropriate methodology in the Adaptive Expectations model, while the corresponding p-value in the Regressive and the Rational Expectations model suggest the 
random effects estimator as the appropriate methodology. 
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Figure 1: Actual vs Expected Availability of Finance 
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